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Abstract 
 
By leaving their engines idling for long periods, drivers contribute unnecessarily to air 
pollution, waste fuel, and produce noise and fumes that harm the environment. Railway level 
crossings are sites where many cars idle, many times a day. In this research, testing two 
psychological theories of influence, we examine the potential to encourage drivers to switch 
off their ignition while waiting at rail crossings. Two field studies presented different signs at 
a busy rail crossing site with a 2-min average wait. Inducing public self-focus (via a 
“Watching Eyes” stimulus) was not effective, even when accompanied by a written 
behavioral instruction. Instead, cueing a private-self focus (“think of yourself”) was more 
effective, doubling the level of behavioral compliance. These findings confirm the need to 
engage the self when trying to instigate self-regulatory action, but that cues evoking self-
surveillance may sometimes be more effective than cues that imply external surveillance. 
Keywords 
psychology, behavior change, driver behavior, self-regulation, watching eyes, pro-
environmental behavior, surveillance, private self-focus, visual cues 
  
3 
 
 
Road transportation is a major source of air pollution that harms the environment and human 
health. One of the most potent forms of pollution arises from stationary traffic with idling 
engines which, as well as wasting fuel, creates an accumulation of particulate matter, carbon 
monoxide, and nitrogen dioxide in the local environment (Shancita et al., 2014). The 
detrimental effects for other road users, pedestrians, and residents are exacerbated in many of 
the United Kingdom’s, and other European, smaller historic towns because streets and 
sidewalks are narrow and traffic concentrations are high. It is recommended that to reduce 
pollution, drivers should turn off their car engines when likely to be stationary for more than 
1 min (Energy Savings Trust, 2016; Transport for London, 2012). Here, we report the results 
of two field experiments that test the effectiveness of interventions based on psychological 
theories of reputational concern and self-regulation to encourage drivers to switch off their 
engines when waiting at a railway level crossing. Results showed that images of "watching 
eyes" had no impact, but messages that combined clear instructions with a private self-
focusing cue were effective, doubleing the rate of pro environmental behavior. 
 
Behavioral science has demonstrated that human decision making can be strongly affected by 
the presence of environmental cues that affect their reasoning or motivation. Because people 
frequently rely on fast and intuitive decision-making strategies, even very minimal cues can 
sometimes have a powerful influence on behavior (Dolan et al., 2012; Thaler & Sunstein, 
2008). A good example is the “watching-eyes effect.” On alternate weeks over a 10-week 
period, Bateson, Nettle, and Roberts (2006) showed either a picture of eyes or a picture of 
flowers near to an honesty box for drinks in a staff break room. Staff members paid nearly 3 
times as much for their drinks when the picture of eyes was displayed. This is in line with the 
assumption that humans have evolved to be strongly attuned to cues that their reputation is at 
stake, because maintaining a reputation as a cooperative person is necessary for survival in a 
social system (Burnham & Hare, 2007; Haley & Fessler, 2005). Thus, subtle surveillance 
cues, such as the watching eyes, can induce cooperative behavior. Subsequent research has 
shown that images of eyes can increase people’s donations to a charity bucket (Powell, 
Roberts, & Nettle, 2012), their decisions to recycle appropriately (Francey & Bergmuller, 
2012), reduce their littering (Bateson, Callow, Holmes, Redmond Roche, & Nettle, 2013; 
Ernest-Jones, Nettle, & Bateson, 2011), and deter them from stealing from public bicycle 
racks (Nettle, Nott, & Bateson, 2012). Even eye-like spots displayed on a computer screen 
have been shown to increase cooperative behavior within economic games (Haley & Fessler, 
2005; Rigdon, Ishii, Watabe, & Kitayama, 2009). 
 
In this article, we report two field experiments that examine whether and why surveillance 
cues have the potential to prompt drivers to turn off their ignitions while waiting. Railway 
level crossings are sites where many car engines idle, many times a day. Any impact on this 
behavior, therefore, has clear benefits. The site chosen for the present research was a busy 
level crossing in Canterbury in Kent, United Kingdom (see Figures 1 and 2). The level 
crossing is located in the shopping district in the city center on a road lined with shops and 
cafes. It is part of a major through route to the rail station and to the main city center bus 
stops. As such, it is heavily congested by both road traffic and pedestrians. During the period 
in which these experiments were conducted, the annual mean concentration of nitrogen 
dioxide at our level-crossing site was 39 g/m3 (Medway Council, 2013) only just meeting 
the European Commission Air Quality target of 40 g/m3 (European Commission, 2014). To 
encourage drivers to turn off their engines while waiting at the level crossing, Canterbury 
City Council had placed a permanent sign at the crossing (see Figure 3). Although some 
research suggests that signs alone can change behavior (e.g., McNees, Egli, Marshall, 
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Schnelle, & Risley, 1976; Thurber & Snow, 1980), the message on this sign was designed 
simply to be an informational request and was not guided by any particular behavioral theory 
(Canterbury City Council, personal communication, November 3, 2016). Perhaps, owing to 
the absence of surveillance cues, the existing sign produced low levels of compliance (see 
baselines). In these experiments, we implemented additional types of surveillance cues in an 
attempt to increase compliance with the instruction to switch off engines. 
 
Experiment 1 
 
Experiment 1 tested whether the addition of “watching eyes” would increase drivers’ 
compliance with the existing instruction to turn off their engines while waiting at the level 
crossing. A black and white picture of a pair of watching eyes was displayed on a clear and 
visible placard on the approach to the railway level crossing. After the barrier dropped and 
vehicles were all stationary, research assistants walked along the sidewalk, recording whether 
each vehicle’s engine was on or off. 
 
 
Figure 1. The level crossing and surrounding area. 
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Figure 2. Example of queuing traffic when barriers are down. 
 
Figure 3. Permanent sign at the level-crossing site, placed by the local council. 
Sample and Procedure 
The experimental data were collected during a 6-month period (October 2012 to March 
2013). The level-crossing barrier drops 4 times per hour throughout the day. Data were 
collected Mondays to Saturdays and between 8:00 a.m. and 6:00 p.m. Data collection took 
place in 1 hr blocks in one of three periods: morning, early to mid-afternoon, and late 
afternoon. We randomly varied the time that data collection took place across days to reduce 
the chance that the same driver would be sampled more than once (e.g., while making their 
regular journeys to or from work), and in order that intervention conditions were not 
confounded with time of testing. Data were only collected during university term time when 
research assistants were available, and not during the Christmas or New Year period. 
 
Across trials, the barriers were down for a mean of 2.33 min  
(SD = 0.79 min). An average of 22 cars were sampled in each trial. Vehicles were grouped by 
barrier drop and assigned to either the baseline or intervention condition. The same condition 
would be used for all barrier drops within 1 hr. Assignment to condition was random across 
the time of the trial and the direction of approach to the barrier. 
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The intervention sign showed a black and white image of a pair of eyes with a direct forward 
gaze in a photo of a man’s face taken from Bateson et al. (2006; see Figure 4). It was 
presented on a 420  594 mm (A2) (16.5  23.4 inch) placard 2 m high at the curbside. The 
placard was positioned approximately 5 m from the existing council sign, and 75 m before 
the barrier such that all vehicles would pass the sign on their approach on the level crossing. 
While the barrier was down and the vehicles were stationary, a single research assistant 
walked along the sidewalk from the barrier to the sign recording whether each vehicle’s 
engine was on or off. 
 
The outcome measure was binary and was measured discreetly by viewing exhaust activity 
and listening for engine noise emitted from each vehicle. Interrater reliability of this method 
was established in a baseline (no placard) sample of 160 vehicles prior to the start of the 
formal data collection period, and showed that there was high consistency in the on/off codes 
of independent judges of the same vehicles, 2(1, N = 160) = 1.48, p = .224, range = 25-33%, 
switch off engines. Discrepancies were inspected and instructions to observers were modified 
to eliminate ambiguities in the coding instructions for the experiment. 
 
Traffic included cars, public transportation, taxis, motorcycles, trucks, and delivery vehicles. 
The experiments focused on the behavior of car drivers because they can be largely assumed 
to have responsibility for their own vehicles.
1
 In Experiment 1, data were collected from 216 
cars (nbaseline = 112, nintervention = 104). The number of drivers who turned their engine off in 
the experimental condition was compared with baseline measurements when no image was 
displayed. Pretest data also confirmed that there was no difference between baseline 
recordings when no placard was displayed versus when a blank placard was displayed (23% 
switched off engines, n = 52 baseline, n = 48 blank sign, 2(6, N = 100) = 7.73, p = .259. To 
control for variance arising from random factors such as the weather, the duration that the 
barrier was down (typically for between 2 and 4 min), the number of people in the vehicle 
(estimated), and time of day of the trial, each of which could potentially affect a driver’s 
decision, these variables were also recorded and were treated as statistical covariates in the 
analyses that follow. 
 
 
 
Figure 4. “Watching Eyes” manipulation (Experiment 1). 
 
 
Results and Discussion 
 
The data were analyzed with logistic regression. Contrary to expectations, results revealed no 
significant difference in the proportion of drivers who turned off their ignition in the 
watching eyes condition (20.2%) and the baseline condition (26.8%), and in fact the trend 
was opposite to the direction predicted by the reputational concern hypothesis. Neither the 
experimental condition nor any of the covariates had a significant association with drivers’ 
decisions to switch off their ignition, 2(6, N = 216) = 7.61, p = .268, Nagelkerke R2 = .05 
(see supplementary materials for full regression model). Experiment 1 failed to find an effect 
7 
 
of a watching eyes intervention on the rate of drivers turning off their engine while waiting at 
a level crossing. 
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This is not the first study that has failed to find a watching eyes effect (e.g., Carbon & 
Hesslinger, 2011; Fehr & Schneider, 2009; Northover, Pedersen, Cohen, & Andrews, 2016). 
Noting the methodology of prior research, however, we conjectured that it may be necessary 
to provide meaningful direction in addition to the surveillance cues of watching eyes. 
Typically, watching eyes are presented with an accompanying written instruction. In our 
case, the sign instructing drivers to turn off their idling engines (placed by the Council) was 
independent of the image of the eyes, and so, drivers would not necessarily link the two 
stimuli. 
 
According to self-regulation theory (Carver & Scheier, 1982), when people are facing a 
behavioral decision, they will default to past habits unless (a) a different behavioral standard 
is made salient and (b) their attention is directed to an assessment of whether they are 
complying with that standard. A powerful method for directing attention in this way is to 
direct it toward the self. That is, people implicitly ask themselves, “am I doing the right 
thing?” and to verify this, they check against the available rules or standards in the situation. 
Watching eyes induce self-focused attention (Pfattheicher & Keller, 2015) directed at the 
public aspects of self, but it may also be necessary to make a relevant behavioral standard 
salient. Therefore, we tested whether adding an explicit instruction to the image of the 
watching eyes (instructive watching eyes) would lead to behavior change. 
 
However, even with a behavioral standard available, there are also reasons why watching 
eyes may not produce the desired behavior. First, they may induce uncertainty or evaluation 
apprehension, which is likely to be experienced as general anxiety about being judged by 
others. This disrupts the regulation of behavior (Abrams & Manstead, 1981; Carver & 
Scheier, 1982; Pfattheicher & Keller, 2015). Second, drivers may not assume that others can 
easily detect whether their engine is on or off. This means that they would not regard the 
behavior as being in the public domain, and therefore, that it was not reputationally relevant. 
Consequently, an effective intervention should be one that induces self-regulation but that 
does not confound it with reputational concern. If the watching eyes effect in previous 
research has depended on participants’ self-regulation to a reputational standard, and its 
absence in the present research was because that standard is either ambiguous or disruptive 
for drivers, we reasoned that a more effective approach should be to use a cue that directs 
attention to the self but does not also create evaluation apprehension. It is possible to direct 
attention to the “private self” (thoughts, values, or feelings) rather than the public self (public 
image; Carver & Scheier, 1982). Private self-focus should increase self-regulation without 
invoking evaluation apprehension or reputational concern. Therefore, in a second experiment, 
we clarified the standard by making it explicit, and then sought to examine whether 
reputational concern versus private self-regulation would be the better route for increasing 
adherence to that standard. Specifically, we tested the effectiveness of a modified 
(instructive) watching eyes manipulation compared with a private self-attention manipulation 
as cues to increase the probability that drivers would switch off their engines while waiting at 
the level crossing. 
Experiment 2 
 
Experiment 2 compared the effectiveness of a modified, instructive watching eyes 
manipulation designed to evoke public self-focus, with a manipulation designed to evoke 
private self-focus. The latter was achieved simply by asking people to “think of yourself.” 
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We hypothesized that the combination of this private self-focusing cue and the relevant 
behavioral standard should be effective. 
 
Sample and Procedure 
 
In Experiment 2, data were collected from 325 cars (nbaseline = 99, ninstructive watching eyes = 123, 
nself-focus = 103). Groups of cars (grouped by barrier drop) were randomly allocated to either 
the baseline condition, or one of the two experimental interventions. In the instructive 
watching eyes condition, the same image of eyes used in Experiment 1 was accompanied by 
the message “When the barriers are down switch off your engine.” In the private self-focused 
condition, the image of eyes was replaced by text priming self-relevance. The message read 
“Think of yourself: When barriers are down switch off your engine” (see Figure 5). The size 
and style of font was held constant across both conditions (font type = Franklin gothic 
medium, font size = 100 pt). All other aspects of the procedure were identical to that of 
Experiment 1. 
 
 
Figure 5. “Instructive Watching Eyes” and “Private Self Focus” manipulations (Experiment 
2). 
Results and Discussion 
 
The logistic regression analysis revealed a significant omnibus test of model coefficients, 
2(7, N = 325) = 26.55, p < .001, Nagelkerke R2 = .11 (see supplementary materials for full 
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regression model). None of the covariates had significant effects but there was a significant 
effect of condition (Wald = 14.95, p < .001). Fewer drivers switched off their engines in the 
baseline (20%) than in the instructive watching eyes condition (30%), B = .60, SE = 0.34, 
Wald = 3.07, p = .08). Significantly more drivers switched off their engines in the private 
self-focused condition (51%) than in the baseline condition, B = 1.57, SE = 0.41, Wald = 
14.68, p < .001. The odds ratios revealed that drivers were 1.83 times more likely to switch 
off their engines in the instructive watching eyes condition, and 4.82 times more likely in the 
private self-focus condition than in the baseline condition (see Figure 6). 
 
Figure 6. Results across Experiments 1 and 2. 
The results of Experiment 2 suggest that the most effective mechanism for encouraging 
drivers to turn off their ignition at a long wait stop was to cue a form of private self-focus, or 
self-surveillance. The inclusion of an explicit behavioral instruction with external monitoring 
cues (watching eyes) did increase the level of behavioral change compared with Experiment 
1, but cueing private self-focus was substantially more effective. 
 
General Discussion 
 
This research has revealed four important findings using a real-world test of a highly 
consequential behavior. We wanted to know how to persuade drivers to switch off their 
ignition in a situation in which they would potentially, collectively, and substantially pollute 
the atmosphere of a large number of residents and pedestrians. The destructive behavior in 
this case lasts, on average, for 2 min, many times per day. Any reduction of this behavior, 
therefore, has clear benefits for all. 
 
First, the mere presence of a sign about air quality has suboptimal impact. Planners at local 
and national levels use such signs to encourage better driver behavior. However, without 
clear evidence of whether and when these messages instigate self-regulatory action, their 
impact may be far less than could be achieved. In our data, baseline behavior in the presence 
of the Council sign showed that only 20% to 25% of motorists routinely switched off their 
ignition when the barriers were down. Some proportion of these will have included vehicles 
with start–stop systems that did not necessarily require active decisions by drivers. 
 
Second, the presence of “watching eyes” in this context was not sufficient to increase 
compliance, and indeed, the trend was that compliance was suppressed rather than elevated. 
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However, as we predicted based on self-regulation theory, the watching eyes had a slightly 
positive effect when presented in conjunction with an explicit behavioral standard 
(instruction). Even so, the improvement was statistically marginal. 
 
Third, and more important, we showed that the most effective mechanism for encouraging 
drivers to turn off their ignitions was to induce private self-focus (i.e., self-focus that does not 
evoke reputational concern). The private self-focus condition had a larger effect than the 
public self-focus (watching eyes) conditions. This is an important finding because it 
highlights that, without a clear opportunity to convey reputational information to others, the 
presence of surveillance cues may distract individuals from complying with requests by 
inducing uncertainty or evaluation apprehension (Abrams & Manstead, 1981; Carver & 
Scheier, 1982). These findings reinforce the importance of engaging the self in behavior 
change, but beyond this suggest that when behavior is not easily publicly observable, it may 
be most effective to stimulate private rather than public self-focus. Effects may also be 
related to the different cognitive systems engaged by the interventions. Watching eyes are 
regarded as an implicit reputational cue, activating automatic, subconscious processing 
(Burnham & Hare, 2007; Fehr & Schneider, 2009; Haley & Fessler, 2005). The private self-
focus instructions, however, prompted a conscious reflection (“think of yourself”) to 
encourage drivers to switch off their engines. It may be that while the watching eyes 
intervention implicitly triggers self-awareness, the private self-focus instructions trigger more 
conscious self-referential processing of the behavioral instructions. 
 
Finally, it is important to note that these effects were not dependent on the presence or 
absence of other cues that might have demanded drivers’ attention or influenced their 
decisions to leave their engines running, such as the weather conditions, the presence of 
passengers, or time of day. The impact of the private self-focus manipulation was to more 
than double the proportion of drivers who switched off their engines, to 50%. If comparable 
theory-based interventions were to be implemented in comparable situations in other cities 
and countries, the potential contribution to reducing air pollution, improving short- and long-
term health, and reducing effects on global warming could be substantial. 
 
Limitations 
 
There are some limitations to this research that should be noted. First, because our 
experiments were conducted in the field, we do not have a measure of whether drivers 
actually attended to the sign or not. Indeed, it is possible that when the level-crossing barriers 
are down and drivers must stop, their attention would be captured elsewhere. However, the 
fact that we found a significant effect of our intervention signs, and indeed a difference 
between two different variants of the message, suggests that they can have a discernable 
benefit even if not all drivers attended to the sign. 
 
A number of methodological factors may also explain the small effects observed in the 
watching eyes conditions. First, the intervention was displayed in the form of a fixed location 
sign that participants drove past on their approach to the level crossing. Because the watching 
eyes effect relies on activating the perception of being observed, it could be argued that 
watching eyes may cease to influence behavior when perceivers are no longer within their 
gaze. Indeed, findings from Nettle and colleagues (2012) suggest that the principal effect of 
signs featuring watching eyes may be to displace offending from the immediate vicinity; 
reductions in bicycle thefts in experimental locations were accompanied by an almost exact 
increase in surrounding areas. If signs featuring images of watching eyes suggest surveillance 
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only of that specific location, then a sign that remains visible to all drivers while queuing at 
the level crossing may prove more effective. 
 
Second, driver behavior was measured by a research assistant who walked along the sidewalk 
recording whether each vehicle’s engine was turned on or off. Every effort was made to 
ensure that measurements were taken discreetly, but it is conceivable that the presence of the 
researcher somehow impeded the impact of the watching eyes. The same could be said, but 
seemed less likely, because of the presence of pedestrians in the environment who, while 
helping to mask the presence of a researcher, could potentially also observe drivers’ behavior. 
However, this would only be true of the first few pedestrians who were still walking toward 
drivers (away from the barriers) as the barriers dropped. Most pedestrians, during the period 
the barriers were down, were facing away from drivers (toward the barriers), and were 
looking for an approaching train. It is not known whether a static image of watching eyes is 
more or less likely to activate reputational concern than transitory and moving people, some 
of whom might glance in a driver’s direction. It could be argued that, in the presence of real 
potential observers, the effects of the images of eyes may become either more or less 
important. A real person is presumably a much stronger cue of social observation than an 
artificial image. Indeed, the usual pattern of results is for watching eyes interventions to be 
maximally effective when there are less people in the immediate vicinity (Ekström, 2012; 
Ernest-Jones et al., 2011; Powell et al., 2012). That being said, Bateson and colleagues (2013) 
recently found evidence of a nonmonotonic relationship in which watching eyes intervention 
was also effective when the environment was very crowded and, thus, the social attention 
paid to any particular individual is low. 
 
Finally, it may be fruitful for future research to test an intervention that pairs a watching eyes 
cue with private self-focus instructions. In the present investigation, we tested the effects of 
both interventions independently, but never in combination. If we assume that the watching 
eyes intervention works by activating a sense of external surveillance, and the private self-
focus intervention works by activating a sense of internal self-surveillance, then it may be 
more effective still to use both cues in conjunction. Future research should consider whether 
both types of behavioral cues may have additive effects, thereby bolstering behavioral change 
above the rates observed in the present investigation. 
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Notes 
1. As a result of pilot work, the decision was taken not to analyze the behavior of drivers 
of buses, taxis, trucks and delivery vehicles, or motorcycles. We learnt that the bus 
company in the city already instructs drivers to switch off their engines while waiting 
at the level crossing. As the drivers’ behavior is under their manager’s control, it 
seemed neither reasonable nor sensible to include them in the sample. For truck and 
delivery vans, as well as motorcycles, we were unsure of their vision of the 
intervention sign. Drivers of trucks and delivery vans are at a different height to car 
drivers and, thus, our signs were below their eye level. Motorcyclists meanwhile, 
tended to approach the level crossing on the inside (center line) rather than the outside 
of the road and so, their view of the sign would tend to be obscured by other traffic 
(see Figure 1). Finally, discussions with taxi drivers indicated that drivers need to 
keep their engines running to maintain heating/air conditioning and communications 
systems. For this reason, we deemed that we could not directly compare their 
behavior with that of car drivers. 
2. Data are available on request from the corresponding author. A sensitivity test 
conducted with GPower software (Faul, Erdfelder, Lang, & Buchner, 2007) showed 
that, assuming a baseline proportion of cars turning their engines off of .25, 
Experiment 1 had .85 power to detect a difference of at least .20 (i.e., from 25%-45% 
switch off). 
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Online Supplementary Appendix Table 1: Full regression model for Experiment 1 
 B SE Wald p 
Number of people in car .29 .20 2.06 .15 
Duration of barrier drop .04 .22 .03 .86 
Weather  20.3 28210.91 .00 .99 
Visibility  -21.16 28210.91 .00 .99 
Time of day .11  .09 .76 
Condition (Baseline vs. Watching Eyes) .62  2.09 .15 
χ2 (6, N = 216) = 7.61, p = .268, Nagelkerke R2 = .05 
Note: Variables coded as follows: Visibility (1 = visible, 2 = foggy or dark), Period of day (1 
= before 3pm, 2 = after 3pm), Weather (1 = dry, 2 = wet).  
 
 
Online Supplementary Appendix Table 2: Full regression model for Experiment 2 
 B SE Wald p 
Number of people in car .04 .17 .07 .80 
Duration of barrier drop .10 .14 .47 .49 
Weather  -.12 .51 .06 .81 
Visibility  .36 .48 .57 .45 
Time of day -.02 .34 .01 .95 
D1 (Baseline vs. Instructive Eyes) .60 .34 3.06 .08 
D2 (Baseline vs. Private Self-Focus) 1.57 .41 14.68 <.001 
χ2 (7, N =  325) = 26.55, p  < .001, Nagelkerke R2 = .11 
Note: Variables coded as follows: Visibility (1 = visible, 2 = foggy or dark), Period of day (1 
= before 3pm, 2 = after 3pm), Weather (1 = dry, 2 = wet).  
 
